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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the implications of the Effects-Based Approach to 
Operations (EBAO) concept on U.S. Army doctrine. EBAO has the potential to radically 
change the Joint concept of warfare if one considers it as a more holistic approach to 
planning and conducting operations. Despite the Army’s resistance to apply EBAO below 
the Corps level, numerous case studies from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) exist to prove otherwise and demonstrate how 
EBAO can be integrated into Army doctrine. This thesis begins by reviewing the 
evolution of EBAO from its inception during Desert Storm through Millennium 
Challenge 2002 (MC02) to its present form. Next, it compares Army doctrine to the 
current EBAO concept and identifies potential shortfalls and conflicts between the two. 
By addressing the major shortfalls or conflicts, this thesis answers the question of 
whether or not EBAO has a role in future Army doctrine. Finally, recommendations are 
made in the form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) as to how EBAO should be implemented into Army doctrine and 
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I. THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Change is difficult to deal with, especially when the methods used in the past 
have become widely accepted and institutionalized. According to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, also known as the “survival of the fittest,” as with all things in nature, when 
the environment changes, the elements in that environment must change or risk 
succumbing to their surroundings and perishing.1 Both the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
world have introduced major changes to the operational environment (OE) that the 
United States, specifically the military, must face. No longer is there a superpower threat 
against the U.S. or a large-scale, purely conventional conflict on the horizon. Today’s 
adversaries are not composed of military-style maneuver organizations. Now, the enemy 
is organized globally, regionally and locally through a web of networked connections that 
make their identification more difficult. These threats are no longer strictly military, but 
span the spectrum of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information 
(PMESII) spheres within this new OE. The new threat calls for the U.S. military to 
transform the way it projects national power, protects vital interests of the U.S. and 
employs military power. Methods for dealing with this new danger have been realized in 
the conception of effects-based operations (EBO) and through the progression of EBO to 
an effects-based approach (EBA) to joint operations. This concept has been in 
development and gradual use over the past fifteen years at the strategic and operational 
levels of war and most recently has been utilized, perhaps unofficially, at the tactical 
level in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s resistance to recognize the importance of EBA 
and include it in its service doctrine is an issue. In this thesis, I address the implications 
of the EBA to Army operational doctrine. In doing so, I initially review the idea of EBA 
and its key tenets and examine the current Army operational doctrine in order to compare 
the two for compatibility and inclusiveness. Next, I identify potential shortfalls and 
conflicts between the two ways of thinking and answer the question of whether or not 
                                                 
1 Charles Darwin, “The Origin of Species,” in The Harvard Classics, ed. Charles Eliot (New York: 
P.F. Collier & Son Corporation, 1956), 87. 
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EBA has a role in future Army doctrine. In doing so, I will identify some of the reasons 
why the Army has been apprehensive about accepting EBA and will refute them to show 
that EBA has a place in Army doctrine. Finally, I will make recommendations on how 
EBA can be implemented into current Army doctrine. Both the initial concept of EBO 
and its successor, EBA, are examples of needed change in Army operations that signify 
the joint forces adaptation to the changing environment. The Army’s failure to embrace 
EBA at all levels of war, to include tactical, is in contradiction to many of the lessons 
learned from current operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Army forces from company to corps have included EBA into their decision-
making and planning procedures in light of the multidimensional operational 
environment they find themselves.2 Also, influential training units within the Army have 
published a number of handbooks on how to include EBA into current operations. The 
continued refinement and acceptance of these ideas by the joint community and 
individual services, similar to the evolution of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
concept, will lead to a more effective and efficient use of military power in conjunction 
with the other elements of national power – diplomatic, information, and economic.  
B. BACKGROUND 
 The reasoning and thought process behind EBO has been present throughout the 
history of warfare, but in a more unorganized and intuitive way. From some of the 
earliest recollections of warfare when armies were directly led by monarchs and 
aristocracy, the coupling of political and military strategy was less difficult to obtain. 
Leaders such as Frederick the Great of Prussia and Napoleon Bonaparte of France were 
the kings, prime ministers, and field commanders of their respective countries, leaving 
the development and projection of national strategy to a single entity and alleviating the 
possibility of different interpretations of that strategy.3 The evolving complexity of 
warfare led to a separation between political and military leaders, which occurred 
predominantly in the last two centuries. This evolution arguably began during the 
                                                 
2 CALL Handbook No. 04-14, Effects-Based Operations: Brigade to Company Level (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, July 2004), iii. 
3 Williamson Murray and Kevin Woods, Thoughts on Effects-Based Operations, Strategy, and the 
Conduct of War, IDA Paper P-3869 (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, January, 2004), 27. 
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American Civil War. For the first two years of the war, President Abraham Lincoln 
struggled to fuse his political strategy for defeating the Confederacy and reuniting the 
Union with the Northern military strategy. Lincoln’s efforts finally came to fruition with 
the appointment of General Ulysses S. Grant as the commander of all field armies.4 This 
coupling of strategy and tactics has become more complicated with the progression of 
warfare, causing a need for an institutionalized approach that takes into account all the 
powers of the nation-state – diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)- to 
project a national strategy. 
 The contemporary concept of EBO came into being as a result of the 1991 Gulf 
War to extract the invading Iraqi military forces from the sovereign state of Kuwait. As a 
part of the preparation for Operation Desert Storm, which was the official beginning of 
combat operations, a planning cell known as the “Black Hole” began work on the overall 
air campaign against Iraq.5 According to Williamson Murray, the term “Effects-Based 
Operation” originated from this organization.6 Through the planning process, the team 
focused on more than just attacking targets. They became concerned with the effects of 
attacking specific targets versus focusing exclusively on the destruction of the target. 
This preoccupation with “second and third order effects . . . mixed with stealth, precision, 
and electronic countermeasures, destroyed Iraq’s integrated air defense system” and 
marked a change from the old Cold War air campaign strategy to a “new age of air power 
employment.”7 This idea of emphasizing effects and outcomes versus inputs alone gained 
momentum and has become one of the leading joint experimental concepts today along 
with Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and Global Force Management (GFM).8  
 The end of the Cold War and the new concept of EBO, demonstrated in Operation 
Desert Storm, caused military thinkers to reexamine the future of warfare. In 1995, Air 
Force Colonel John Warden took a theoretical approach to the future of conflict and laid 
                                                 
4 Murray and Woods, 27-28. 
5 Williamson Murray, “Transformation: Volume II,” in Transformation Concepts for National Security 
in the 21st Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 3. 
6 Ibid., 3. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Peter Pace, Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006 Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) (dated 17 January 2006). 
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the “intellectual foundation” that much of the premise behind EBO is currently based.9 
He argued that adversaries should be viewed as systems and that “parallel warfare” 
would dominate in a post-Cold War world.10 He further claimed that “technology would 
allow the United States to attack multiple, vital targets simultaneously at the strategic 
level, and thus collapse an adversary’s system, leaving him with no means to respond.”11 
Later, in 2001, Air Force Brigadier General David Deptula, one of the leading planners in 
the “Black Hole” as a Lieutenant Colonel, expounded on his experiences during the Gulf 
War and the notion of effects and the technological nature of war. His monograph 
entitled Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare, furthered Warden’s 
notion of parallel warfare, adding to the growth of EBO as a concept. 
 Until 2000, EBO was strictly an Air Force venture focusing on stealth and 
precision munitions. That year, U.S. Joint Forces Command began work on a joint 
version of EBO, taking a broader point of view emphasizing the strategic integration of 
national power in the form of DIME. At the time, EBO was marketed as a new way of 
doing business that could potentially change the way that staffs conducted preparation 
and execution of combat operations. Despite its potential, EBO has its detractors. In fact, 
the preponderance of opposition to EBO is based on potential change to armed services 
doctrine. The Army, for example, initially felt threatened by the introduction of EBO as a 
joint concept because it inferred a preference for Air Force use of stealth and precision 
munitions and potentially reducing the need for Army forces.12 JFCOM would eventually 
embrace the Air Force’s operational and tactical targeting processes in the form of 
Effects Tasking Order (ETO) and Priority Effects List (PEL).13  
 The events of September 11, 2001, identified a new threat to U.S. national 
security and the need for a new way to fight an unconventional adversary. While 
                                                 
9 Gary H. Cheek, “Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant Maneuver?” in Transformation 
Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, September 2002), 74. 
10 Ibid., 74. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 73. 
13 U.S. Army Futures Center, “History and Pathways of the Effects-Based Approach (EBA) to Joint 
Operations,” powerpoint presentation obtained from COL Steve Bullimore, U.S. Army Capabilities 
Integration Center on August 8, 2006, 3. 
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international terrorism is a traditional threat, it was never considered a high priority in 
terms of U.S. national security until 9/11. This new threat, now labeled transnational 
terrorism, took EBO to a different level, making it a key component to future U.S. joint 
operations.14 
C. WHY EBO? 
 A dynamic global political environment and the new threat to national security 
have warranted a new way of thinking about the conduct of war. The pure military form 
of EBO, which can be considered the “Air Force” form, deals solely with the military 
side of the equation and very little with the political or civilian side. When JFCOM took 
on the task of developing a joint approach to EBO, they acknowledged the change in the 
political and military environment that required less of a pure military approach, utilizing 
a Cold War mentality, and looked for a way to encapsulate all aspects of warfare which 
includes PMESII. JFCOM also recognized that EBO may not necessarily be applicable to 
every military scenario due to a continued presence of potential conventional threats in 
the forms of North Korea and Iran. This recognition is evident in the change of 
terminology from EBO to an effects-based approach to joint operations that took place in 
2006. The JWFC went from defining EBO as the way to conduct military operations to 
replacing EBO with EBA as a way of conducting military operations.15 
D. TENETS OF EBA 
 The basic premise behind EBA is viewing the OE as a system-of-systems that are 
interlinked and affected by each other as a result of actions on any individual system.  
                                                 
14 U.S. Army Futures Center, 3. 
15 Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-
Based Approach to Joint Operations (Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 24 
February 2006), i. 
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Figure 1.   Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment16 
 
 These actions produce effects, which according to the Joint Warfighting Center 
(JWFC), are defined as “1. The physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results 
from an action, a set of actions, or another effect” and “2. A change to a condition, 
behavior, or degree of freedom.”17 In order to gain this perspective, the joint forces 
commander (JFC) and his staff must have a holistic understanding of the OE that they are 
preparing for or conducting operations in.18 Without an expanded situational awareness 
of the environment, neither the commander nor staff are able to clearly specify objectives 
and tasks necessary for success.  
                                                 
16 Joint Warfighting Center, II-2. 
17 Ibid., I-3. 
18 Ibid., II-1. 
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 At the broadest level, the systems that compose the OE are primarily the PMESII. 
These interconnected systems consist of nodes, which are fundamental elements “that 
represent a person, place, or thing,” and links “that represent a behavioral, physical, or 
functional relationship between nodes.”19 Some nodes are designated as key nodes 
because of their relation “to a strategic or operational effect and/or a center of gravity 
(COG)” and are usually present in multiple systems.20 
 The realization of near-complete situational awareness of the OE is achieved 
through a technique known as system-of-systems analysis (SOSA). This analytical 
process helps identify where forces are needed in order to disrupt or destroy the system, 
thus achieving a specified objective. It is conducted horizontally across different elements 
of the OE, and vertically from the tactical to the strategic level of military operations. 
Applying an EBA to joint operations calls for SOSA to be implemented into the Joint 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) process. Upon completion of the SOSA, 
a COG analysis can be conducted in order to identify potential COGs, narrowing down 
the areas that require influence to achieve desired effects.  
The change in thinking from EBO to an EBA to joint operations is most evident 
in JFCOM’s approach to introducing EBA into the Joint Operations Planning Process 
(JOPP) in the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint 
Operations, published by the JWFC in February 2006. According to this document, EBA 
can be applied to the three main elements of the joint warfighting process – planning, 
execution, and assessment.21 
E. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO PLANNING 
 Applying an EBA to the JOPP enhances the planning of operations from the 
tactical to the strategic level, as well as give the JFC more options for conducting joint 
operations. In addition to the standard JOPP, additional steps are included that focus on  
 
 
                                                 
19 Joint Warfighting Center, I-3. 
20 Ibid., I-3. 
21 Ibid., i. 
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the EBA. These steps are embedded into both the mission analysis and course of action 
(COA) determination processes and build upon an understanding of the system-of-
systems perspective. 
 The two key additions to the mission analysis process are (1) the definition of the 
OE as a system-of-systems, as mentioned before, and (2) the identification of desired and 
undesired effects, corresponding measures of effectiveness (MOE), and potential COGs. 
Through this procedure, the purposes and objectives of the operation are identified, which 
are specific to each system and identify which part of the system is to be affected in order 
to determine proper effects and their related tasks. Effects are used as a means to help 
build and sustain unity of effort and bridge the gap between objectives and actions.22 
From this, a PEL is created, listing the effects that are required to achieve objectives. 
Next, a task list is developed, which correlates tasks to be completed to create appropriate 
effects from the PEL. MOEs are then determined for the future assessment of whether the 
effects from the PEL are the right ones needed to affect the system and the OE. This 
helps to determine if the right things are being done. 
 During COA development, effects are the baseline that all COAs are dependent 
upon. Each COA is required to attain desired effects, and avoid creating undesired 
effects, as determined by the mission analysis and the JFC’s guidance. The EBA to COA 
development consists of six additional steps in the standard process. First, using the 
SOSA technique and the JIPB, the OE is once again viewed through the system-of-
systems perspective. Second, the critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), 
critical vulnerabilities (CV), and key nodes are identified. Third, friendly desired effects 
are coupled with the COAs. Fourth, enemy desired effects are coupled with the COAs. 
Fifth, both the attainment of friendly and enemy desired effects are compared within the 
COA. And last, the risks for undesired effects within the friendly COA are determined.23 
                                                 
22 Stephen E. Runals, “RE: USJFCOM Public Feedback” Email to author, 15 August 2006. 
23 Joint Warfighting Center, III-13. 
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Figure 2.   Course of Action Determination Process24 
  
 Once the development of potential COAs is completed, each one is vetted through 
the analysis, comparison, and selection phase of the determination process. The result is a 
workable list of COAs that are then translated into a plan or order in preparation for 
                                                 
24 Joint Warfighting Center, III-13. 
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execution. If effects are kept in mind during planning, “then adaptation during  
execution is made far easier and more rapidly.”25 
F. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO EXECUTION 
 The execution of the joint plan is ideally done by the integration with other 
elements of national power in order to attain the predetermined desired effects on the 
identified systems within the OE. This process requires constant “monitoring, assessing, 
planning and directing actions” to ensure that appropriate tasks correspond to effects 
attainment and accomplishment of objectives.26 The problem with controlling this 
dynamic process of task coordination is inherent in “three critical activities: (1) locating 
and monitoring key systems, (2) directing actions against key nodes within those systems 
and (3) assessing the system effects of those actions.”27 These activities can be very time 
consuming and subjective to interpretation. 
 Two organizations that were created at the joint task force level, with EBA in 
mind, were the Effects Working Group (EWG) and the Effects Assessment Cell (EAC). 
The EWG is specifically responsible for effects development during the planning stage, 
but during the execution stage they work with the EAC to determine why desired effects 
are not achieved and undesired ones achieved. The EWG then makes recommendations 
for changes in effects (or tasks) to the JFC for future operations. The EAC applies the 
MOEs against the intelligence gathered on the systems to be affected to determine 
whether the desired effects have been achieved.  
G. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT 
 Throughout the phases of joint operations it is critical to accurately assess the 
mission effectiveness based on JFC objectives. An EBA to assessment accomplishes this 
through the EAC by applying MOEs and measures of performance (MOP). Specifically, 
answering the questions “how effective is the plan,” and “are the assigned missions, 
objectives, and desired effects being achieved.”28 MOEs deal with creating effects, while 
MOPs deal with task accomplishment. These metrics, which can be either qualitative or 
                                                 
25 Joint Warfighting Center, III-23. 
26 Ibid., IV-2. 
27 Ibid., IV-2. 
28 Ibid., IV-8. 
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quantitative, are reported to the EAC for assessment followed by reports to the EWG for 
further analysis. Quantitative metrics are preferred over qualitative metrics..  
H. SUMMARY 
 The progression from the early form of EBO to the current more holistic EBA to 
joint operations has faced many challenges and opponents. While EBA may not be 
perfect, it is the right direction. The synergism of PMESII requires that future joint 
operations planning and execution embrace a new integrative process at all levels of war. 
The way to do this is through the understanding of the OE as a networked, interactive 
system-of-systems that is influenced through the use of effects. This challenge will not be 
solely a military responsibility, but an interagency, and multi-national venture to make 
the world a safer place. It also makes the pursuit of EBA to joint operations an inevitable 
necessity for the future. In the next chapter, I will address the current Army operational 
doctrine as well as summarize developments for future joint operations. This comparison 
and contrast of service and joint doctrines will show that current Army doctrine must be 
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II. ARMY OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 For the past 230 years, doctrine has provided the foundation for Army operations. 
As the United States has grown both as a country and a military power within a changing 
OE, the need for an evolving doctrine is evident. The relevancy of the Army is dependent 
on its ability to maintain current and pertinent sets of guidelines as a basis for budgeting, 
tactics and operational art. The change from a bipolar Cold War scenario to a single 
hegemonic great power, engaged in a “long war,” requires the Army to efficiently 
transform.29 The development of joint doctrine and its applicability to the Army is a 
critical part of this transformation. Army doctrine must change as joint doctrine 
progresses and must do so in the same developmental direction. In the last chapter, I 
summarized the history and basic concept of Joint EBA. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a brief history of the development of Army doctrine, summarize current Army 
operational doctrine, and offer a concise look at future Army doctrine in joint operations.  
B.  HISTORY OF ARMY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
 Army doctrine gradually evolved through time from its beginnings as a 
standardization process in the Continental Army during the 18th century to its current 
form of addressing future national security threats in a joint forces context. The first 
American military doctrine was developed by a Prussian volunteer, Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Steuben, who, as an aide and future Inspector General for General George 
Washington, developed the Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the 
United States. This regulation focused on basic standards within the Army that all 
Soldiers were required to adhere to. Steuben’s “Blue Book” remained in force into the 
19th century. Writings from military thinkers like Jomini and Clausewitz were translated 
into English and influenced American doctrine.30 The first American author of military 
doctrine, Henry W. Halleck, took many of Jomini’s ideas and applied them to the United 
                                                 
29 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 6 February 2006), v. 
30 John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United 
States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Military History Office, April 1996), 11. 
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States military. His book, Elements of Military Art and Science was published in 1846. 
Many other military and academic professionals, to include West Point professors Dennis 
Hart Mahan, and Emery Upton, eventually took the lessons learned from the Napoleonic 
wars, as well as the American wars and introduced new ideas on doctrine in the form of 
the first official military doctrine manuals, beginning with the Field Service Regulations 
published in 1905 by the War Department.31 These regulations would continue to be 
updated into the 1960s, building on the lessons learned from U.S. conflicts through most 
of the 20th century. From the origins of the U.S. Army until 1982, the majority of Army 
doctrine produced was focused on tactical operations with very little emphasis on joint 
operations. 
 The AirLand Battle Doctrine published in 1982, emphasized a more holistic view 
of the battlefield. The main tenet of this doctrine was keeping the enemy off balance 
while pursuing initiative and momentum. AirLand Battle doctrine focused on the 
Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat in Europe and lasted until 1993 when it morphed into AirLand 
Operations Doctrine.32 This post-Cold War set of guidelines was necessary due to the fall 
of the Soviet Union as incorporated lessons from Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm in 1991. The lack of an equal foe in the form of the Soviet Union and the conduct 
of operations during the build-up to and execution of the Gulf War resulted in a new 
operations doctrine. This new doctrine emphasized how the Army would fight as a part of 
a future joint, combined, and interagency U.S. force. Less than a decade later, these 
principles were challenged again as a result of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
C.  BASICS OF CURRENT ARMY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
 The Army defines doctrine as a “concise expression of how Army forces 
contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements”33 It provides 
guidance, not rules, to the force and offers a sound reference to ensure that operations are 
as standardized as possible across a wide range of conflict and support operations. The 
                                                 
31 Romjue, 13. 
32 Ibid., 17. 
33 Field Manual 1, The Army (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 
2005), 1-20. 
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inevitable change in national security threats and a complementary national military 
strategy require Army doctrine to reflect these adjustments as well. It is refined and 
developed through education, social and technological innovation, as well as changes in 
the operational environment. Doctrine also promotes intellectual thinking as well as 
innovative reasoning to ensure that the Army remains the most effective and efficient 
landpower in the world. 
 The current conduct of Army operations is based on capstone and keystone 
doctrine – terms used to identify key documents that explain how the Army functions. 
They are a culmination of principles and a baseline for Army forces to perform 
operations. These documents “provide the fundamental principles for employing 
landpower” and “provide doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum 
operations.”34 Capstone doctrine is comprised of Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, dated 
June 2005, and establishes the basic principles for implementing landpower, provides a 
description of the “profession of arms,” and expands on the Army involvement in joint 
forces.35 FM 3-0, Operations, dated June 2001, is the second capstone doctrine. It 
establishes the role of the Army in full spectrum operations, discusses the concept of 
battle command and details the operations process in offensive, defensive, stability, and 
support operations.36 The two primary keystone documents that the Army relies on for 
operation standardization are FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, dated 
January 2005, and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 
dated August 2003. FM 5-0 provides fundamental principles to planning and the 
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also implements a doctrinal 
framework for military decision-making in the forms of the military decision-making 
process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures (TLP).37 FM 6-0 is the doctrinal basis for 
command and control (C2) in all Army operations to include contributions to joint 
                                                 
34 Field Manual Interim 5-0.1, The Operations Process (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 31 March 2006), vi. 
35 Field Manual 1, Foreword. 
36 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 
2001), vii. 
37 Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, 
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operations.38 All of these foundational documents constitute the fundamentals of Army 
operations and the procedures that go into their conduct. As history continues to evolve, 
so must these manuals. 
 Army operational doctrine is based on the Army’s operational concept that 
encompasses four fundamental elements – “combined arms, joint interdependence, full 
spectrum operations, and mission command.”39 This concept is the basis for how the 
Army fights and is the precursor to TTPs, force organization, logistical support and 
training. It is separate from future conceptual doctrine, in that it is applicable to the 
current national and global situation and changes as the national military strategy is 
adjusted. 
 The concept of combined arms brings together the various branches of the Army 
in the pursuit of a synergistic conduct of a multitude of missions. The various branches of 
the Army from conventional forces, such as infantry, armor and field artillery, coupled 
with functional areas like information operations, public affairs, and multi-functional 
logisticians, and specialty areas like special forces, psychological operations and civil 
affairs are brought together to create the most effective and comprehensive force to 
defeat an enemy or support an operation within a minimum amount of time and least 
amount of casualties.40 
 Joint interdependence is the combination of the separate services into a joint force 
that utilizes all the capabilities of land, sea, air and space power. The Army, along with 
the Marine Corps, provides the necessary ground component to any joint mission giving 
the JFC the capability to take and hold terrain. Future Army forces will always be a part 
of an integrated joint force and will rely on other services to complement their unique 
capabilities.41 For this reason, further discussion of Army doctrine and joint operations is 
provided later in this chapter. 
                                                 
38 Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 11 August 2003), viii. 
39 Field Manual 1, 3-3. 
40 Field Manual 1, 3-5. 
41 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations: The Army’s Future Force Capstone 
Concept 2015-2024 Version 2.0 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Department of the Army, Headquarters, United 
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 According to Field Manual 1, Army full spectrum operations include “offensive, 
defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support operations.”42 The first three are 
conducted outside the boundaries of the U.S., while the fourth is applicable within the 
U.S. boundaries. The ability to conduct these missions simultaneously encompasses full 
spectrum operations. This principle acknowledges the current challenge of confronting 
both conventional and irregular warfare, an important criterion to future operational 
doctrine. 
 The last of the four operational concept elements – mission command – is simply 
the preferred way of C2 within the Army. It allows forces to accomplish their missions 
without being impeded by cumbersome micro-managerial regulations and procedures and 
places command responsibility at every level of organization from the squad leader to the 
army and joint force commander. The adherence to mission command entails consistent 
Army flexibility to prepare and react to the numerous and varied required missions. 
 Unified action is another basic Army principle and a baseline concept to EBA. 
“Under unified action, commanders integrate joint, single-service, special, and supporting 
operations with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational – to include United 
Nations (UN) – operations.”43 The goal of unified action is to capitalize on the unity of 
effort of various capabilities and force structure to achieve both strategic and operational 
objectives through tactical means.44 In order to successfully accomplish the mission, the 
commander must ensure that the overall objectives are understood and adhered to across 
the three levels of war. These levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) are 
interdependent. The strategic level incorporates national policy and objectives, while the 
operational level is the campaign or major operation that is used to project policy within 
areas of operation (AO). The tactical level is the means of accomplishing strategic goals 
through the use of lethal and non-lethal force across the spectrum of military capabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
42 Field Manual 1, 3-4. 
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The linkages between these three levels are paramount in successfully projecting policy 
and will on U.S. vital interests in the international community and achieving the four 
fundamental elements. 
 The translation of strategic goals into operational objectives and tactical actions is 
achieved through key planning and preparation mechanisms used by the Army – the 
military decision-making process (MDMP). The MDMP “is a process that integrates the 
activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders in developing an 
operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission; developing, 
analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action; and 
producing an operation plan or order.”45 This process can be as detailed as necessary 
when time permits or can be narrowed down into a brief process that allows for shorter 
reaction times.  
 In order for the Army to ensure it is integrated with joint doctrine and concepts, 
FM 3-0, FM 5-0, and FM 6-0 are being revised in conjunction with Joint Publication (JP) 
3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.46 
Unfortunately, this is not the case in terms of EBA. The next section will elaborate on 
how the Army sees its role in the future joint force of the 21st century. 
D.  FUTURE ARMY DOCTRINE AND JOINT OPERATIONS 
 Developments in Army doctrine recognize the recent changes in the operational 
environment and counter these “persistent and emerging challenges” by refining past 
doctrine and introducing newer ideas.47 The challenges come in the form of “terrorism, 
insurgency, civil war, state-on-state, or coalition conflict” and are categorized as 
“irregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive,” according to the latest National 
Defense Strategy (NDS).48 To meet these challenges, the Army plans to continue 
development of innovative technologies, create a more versatile and agile force, advance 
its ability to project power rapidly around the globe and maintain multi-dimensional 
capabilities. These efforts will be accomplished through the capitalization of knowledge, 
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use of speed in power projection and simultaneity of operations and contribution to 
homeland security. They will also further rely on multidimensional operations, 
interagency collaboration, multinational operations, and technology advancement.49 
 The difficulties that future commanders will face are the integration of new 
technologies, and more importantly, the adjustment from purely force-on-force scenarios 
to those that require dealing with civilian and enemy elements simultaneously from 
multiple dimensions. These types of operational environments will require the careful 
balancing of lethal and non-lethal forces and actions in conjunction with non-military 
capabilities.   
 According to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, 
The Army in Joint Operations: The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024, 
future Army operations will be conducted “in a joint, interagency, and multinational 
(JIM) context,” due to the nature of a potential multidimensional enemy that uses a 
variety of unconventional means in attempting to defeat U.S. forces.50 Because of the 
changing tactics and strategies used by enemy forces, it has become essential for 
commanders at all levels to understand the threat and how to defeat it through 
cooperation with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, and 
economic. In many instances where the diplomatic, economic, and informational 
executors of national power are unable to accomplish their duties because of hostilities 
within the area of operations or the context within which these powers are required, 
military execution of these powers may be required until secured conditions are 
established. 
 The Joint Warfighting Center is currently developing the concept of an effects-
based approach to operations (EBAO) as one of the solutions to these dilemmas. While 
this evolving model is widely accepted and utilized across joint task forces and joint 
commands at the strategic and operational levels, the Army has not included it into 
current or future operational doctrine. In fact, the latest edition of Field Manual Interim 
(FMI) 5-0.1, The Operations Process, clearly states that “Army forces will not adopt the 
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joint system analysis of the operational environment, an effects-based approach to 
planning, or effects assessment as described in JP 3-0 [Revision Final Coordination] 
(RFC).”51 The manual goes further in claiming that EBA is conducted only at the joint 
strategic and operational levels of war and introduces confusion over key definitions of 
terms, like effects, used by the Army and Joint community.52 The Army’s deletion of 
EBAO from current and future operational doctrine restricts the commander’s ability at 
the tactical level to officially use everything at his disposal. For reasons unknown, this 
exclusion does not represent the current use and success of EBAO at the tactical level in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.53  
E.  SUMMARY 
 The need to refine Army operational doctrine, in conjunction with joint doctrine 
based on the changing operational environment, is vital to the future relevancy of the 
Army. Current and future Army areas of operation will contain more non-combatant and 
insurgent forces, fighting from behind the protection of civilians and shadow 
organizations. These changes require Army commanders to have access to more avenues 
of influence within his operational environment. Because of this, Army doctrine must 
accept emerging concepts like EBAO. In the next chapter, I will identify potential 
shortfalls and conflicts between joint EBAO and current Army doctrine and explore 
whether or not EBAO is right for the Army.  
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III. POTENTIAL SHORTFALLS AND CONFLICTS TO 
INCLUDING EBAO IN ARMY DOCTRINE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 The development of new doctrine from innovative and cutting-edge concepts can 
be a timely and repetitive process that takes numerous revisions in order to get the 
particulars of new ideas correct. Attempting to deploy new concepts into the operating 
field can sometimes reveal shortcomings and difficulties in the implementation of these 
new methods of conducting operations and cause a tidal wave of criticism. This is 
especially true when trying to impose changes on those who have operated comfortably 
within past forms of doctrine. The development of EBAO is no exception to criticism and 
in some cases, resentment. In this chapter, I will identify many of the problems that 
potentially plague the integration of EBAO into current Army doctrine. These criticisms 
and challenges span the gamut of declaring that the discussion over effects-based 
approaches is only a matter of semantics to those that pin these approaches as serious 
errors in development that put the security of the nation at risk.54 I will draw upon the 
basics of EBAO in Chapter I and the current Army operational doctrine in Chapter II to 
point out how EBAO is perceived by both the joint and Army communities. This chapter 
will identify the problems that Chapter IV will refute and/or support and lay the 
groundwork for the recommendations of implementation that will be presented in 
Chapter V. 
 As mentioned earlier, doctrine can go through many revisions before it is 
considered to be acceptable to the units and personnel who are expected to utilize it. Even 
when these new ideas are considered acceptable, they continue to go through 
modifications as lessons are learned through trial and error. Professor James B. Ellsworth 
of the U.S. Naval War College, in responding to a critique of EBAO, remarked that “no 
successful combat doctrine has ever emerged coherent and flawless from the outset: ‘first 
drafts’ tend to be ‘80 percent solutions’ that appear ill defined and improbable to the 
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masters of the old ways.”55 When looking at the evolution of EBAO, one must 
understand that the initial draft of the concept was an “80 percent” solution and not 
completely ready for implementation into the operating joint or separate service forces. 
This is the reason it was marked as a concept and not doctrine. Only after it goes through 
a number of iterations will it become applicable to current Army operations and accepted 
by senior leaders. As Ellsworth points out, consider the example of the initial concept of 
carrier warfare originally being declared “heresy” by the “battleship admirals” and only 
later, after many revisions and changes in perceptions, did it become accepted as one of 
the staples of naval warfare in the twentieth century.56 Even though the initial concepts of 
EBAO have gone through multiple revisions and are now being considered for doctrine, 
the fact remains that concepts that work must be quickly integrated into TTPs for use by 
forces deployed throughout the world. Instead of relying on trial and error with thousands 
of Soldier’s lives at risk in Iraq and Afghanistan, Joint and Army communities must work 
together to integrate future concepts into doctrine and focus on guarding against future 
casualties. 
 The struggle for what is right doctrinally for joint operations and what is right for 
Army operations has been an issue from the inception of joint warfare.57 Competition 
between JFCOM and the Army has become so heated that the latest edition of FMI 5-0.1 
openly rejects EBAO and states that “Army forces will not adopt the joint systems 
analysis of the operational environment, an effects-based approach to planning, or effects 
assessment as described in JP 3-0 (RFC).”58 Such a commanding rejection of an up-and-
coming developmental joint concept, promoted by the joint community, can only help to 
further confuse and serve to convolute the future of joint operations in warfare. 
B.  MISINTERPRETATIONS OF EBAO 
 One of the most reoccurring criticisms of the EBAO concept is the perceived 
inconsistency in the definitions of the effects-based concept and the operational terms 
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used to explain it. FMI 5-0.1 even goes as far as stating that one of the fundamental 
difficulties of understanding EBAO is “the lack of consensus as to what it is and how to 
use it,” resulting in confusion over the revised explanation given in the field manual.59 
When it was first marketed to the separate services, it was labeled as the new way of 
conducting operations that would revolutionize warfare.60 This lends to the reason it was 
presented as “effects-based operations” and later modified to an “approach,” changing it 
from being “the way,” to being “a way” of conducting operations. Others remark that 
labeling EBAO as a solution to conducting operations is wrong, that it is actually a way 
of planning for operations with emphasis on assessment and analysis methods. 61 Critics 
also point out that focusing and labeling EBAO as effects oriented, gives the perception 
that commanders in the past were never concerned with such an important element of 
warfare as effects.62 By supposedly mislabeling EBAO something that it is not, concept 
developers alienate senior leaders that are comfortable with planning and conducting 
operations within the framework of AirLand Battle doctrine and the current Army 
Operational Concept. 
 Another area that poses difficulties to the acceptability of EBAO is the differences 
in definitions of key operational terms used both by the Joint and Army communities. 
Terms such as effects, objectives, tasks, and center of gravity have caused confusion 
within the Army because of the alternative definitions that JFCOM has given in order to 
define what the principles and processes of EBAO are. This problem has become such an 
issue that it was included in an e-mail from retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul 
Van Riper to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Peter Pace, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Hagee, and the Chief of Staff of the 
Army (CSA), General Peter Schoomaker. Lieutenant General Van Riper writes that since 
2002 he has witnessed numerous e-mails and papers that attempt to define what “effects” 
really are and that all the discussion of a true definition has caused the confusion of field 
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grade officers across the services who are attempting to understand EBAO. 63 This issue 
is also pointed out by the Director of the Army Futures Center, Lieutenant General John 
Curran, in a memorandum to subordinate commanders in TRADOC that directs how 
Army training commands should go about potentially introducing the concepts of EBAO 
into their curricula. According to the memorandum, EBAO “has created some confusion 
in the force . . . . with new terms and ideas.”64 
C.  IS EBAO REALLY NECESSARY 
 The necessity to change the way one conducts himself is dependent upon changes 
in the environment and, as mentioned in Chapter I, if one does not adapt to the changing 
environment around him, he runs the risk of succumbing to that environment. Critics of 
EBAO accept the assertion that the OE has changed over the past fifteen years, but claim 
that the changes in the OE do not warrant a change in doctrine to reflect EBAO. Their 
argument is that EBAO is nothing new and that the Army Operational Concept has 
always taken into account the principles of an effects-based concept, but in different 
terms.65 Current Army doctrine claims that even when operation orders include new joint 
concepts such as effects-oriented outcomes, new planning or execution methods are not 
needed and should not be looked upon as replacements to what has worked in the past.66  
D.  INAPPLICABLE AT TACTICAL LEVELS OF OPERATION 
 The applicability of EBAO towards tactical levels of warfare is also a major 
concern of Army leadership. Current Army policy claims that EBAO is not designed to 
be implemented by tactical forces. It is solely meant to be applied to the strategic and 
operational levels of war by staffs that are properly manned to conduct effects-based 
processes, which are perceived to be too complex for tactical staffs.67 The methods 
prescribed by EBAO advocates are seen as being too cumbersome, manpower intensive, 
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and intelligence dependent for the limitations of a tactical commander and his staff. Since 
principles of conventional force-on-force tactical warfare advocate that non-military 
elements of DIME are less important than actual enemy forces, critics of EBAO claim 
that tacticians have no need to concern themselves with the system-of-systems approach 
which encompasses all the elements of national power. 
 These same critics also claim that tactical commanders do not have the ability to 
understand the difference between effects and tasks. This argument is not purely based on 
the difference in the definition of the two terms, but the ability of a subordinate 
commander to decide between completing an assigned task and just achieving a desired 
effect without attempting to complete the task. According to one briefing conducted by 
the Joint and Army Concepts Division (JACD) of the Army Capabilities Integration 
Center (ARCIC),  
Giving a subordinate unit an option to either accomplish a task or generate 
an effect is outrageous. Tactical ground combat is too complex for this 
kind of latitude.68  
Apparently, tactical commanders and staffs are seen as not being experienced enough to 
make decisions on whether to attempt an assigned task from an operational headquarters 
that may be high-risk or rather conduct an implied task that may be less risky that would 
obtain the same effects desired from the operational and strategic level. These 
assumptions will prove detrimental to the applicability of EBAO by isolating subordinate 
units into being solely executioners of a plan versus being vital contributors into the 
planning and execution portions of the EBAO process. 
E.  INCOMPATIBILITY WITH CERTAIN SYSTEMS 
 Another view held by those who do not agree with EBAO methodology is the 
notion that an effects-based analysis process does not work with systems that are 
interactively complex. General Van Riper argues in his famous e-mail to the CJCS and 
service chiefs that when Colonels Deptula and Warden initially pitched the idea of EBO, 
they attempted to apply a method of conducting operations on systems that it was not 
conceived to be used on. Systems that include the elements of diplomacy, information 
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and economics are seen as being too unpredictable for military planners to analyze and 
recommend options for obtaining certain effects in order to meet certain end states.69 
 Major General David Fastabend in January 2006, then Chief of Staff and Deputy 
Director of the Army Futures Center, reinforces General Van Riper’s argument by posing 
that this problem is a “fatal flaw” in EBAO. By taking a reductionist method like system 
analysis, meant for “structurally complex systems” and applying it to an “interactively 
complex system” that requires a holistic method like EBAO, and vice versa is 
unacceptable.70 These arguments suggest that the inception of EBAO is an attempt to 
apply a new concept to all operations instead of just some. 
F.  UNCERTAIN MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
The introduction of SoSA from the EBAO concept in order to identify areas that 
need to be analyzed and assessed for the purpose of creating effects and measuring those 
effects and performances has caused concern among some. One of the issues with 
conducting this type of analysis is the subjectivity of the criteria used to evaluate the 
interconnectivity of the systems.   
When attempting to establish what the measurement criteria should be in 
determining success, some critics believe that EBAO is incapable of making these 
determinations. The use of a subjective metric could easily skew the analysis of whether 
a desired effect is truly being achieved, creating more confusion within the OE and 
circumventing the need for an EBA to joint operations. Milan Vego, a Professor of 
Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College, even 
stated as a part of an in-depth critique that  
The effects-based approach to warfare is heavily dependent on 
mathematical methods for predicting and measuring effects. This 
increasing trend toward using various metrics to assess essentially 
unquantifiable aspects of warfare only reinforces the unrealistic views of 
many that warfare is a science rather than both an art and a science.71 
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Comments like these undermine the basic notion that EBAO is measurably a 
better way of defeating the enemy while stabilizing the OE from a holistic 
approach. 
G.  CULTURAL RESISTANCE 
 Attempting to change doctrine throughout the Army, let alone implementing 
concepts from external sources such as JFCOM, will be an uphill battle, especially given 
the fact that the U.S. military forces are decisively engaged in current operations in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan. As Colonel Allen Batschelet puts it, “Changing the culture will 
take many years as leaders and staffs become familiar with the concept and effects-based 
thinking becomes inculcated in service and joint educational programs and institutions.”72 
But before there can even be hope that effects-based concepts will be accepted, senior 
Army leaders must be convinced that it is worthwhile and has added value to current 
doctrine.  
 Not only will the Army and joint cultures need to accept these concepts, but the 
agencies and organizations that make up the diplomatic, informational and economic 
elements of national power must also. The potential for convincing these non-military 
entities is not seen as being very promising. Some doubt that even a Presidential Order 
would cause the interagency staff to work together and that only “the threat of bodily 
harm [would] get them to work together and develop an ‘interagency’ campaign plan.”73  
The obstacles are many, to include attempting to get those who are in their comfort zone 
with the current ways of conducting business to try something different and for the most 
part unproven in their eyes. 
H.  LACK OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 As one critic pointed out earlier, EBAO is meant for joint staffs that have the 
proper manpower and experience to conduct effects-based operations, while staffs at the 
tactical level are not prepared to take on a role that includes in-depth analysis of a highly 
complex system.74 Many staffs from the corps to the battalion level are limited in the 
                                                 
72 Batschelet, 11. 
73 U.S. Army Futures Center, 11. 
74 Field Manual Interim 5-0.1, 1-10. 
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number of individuals that they have to conduct planning, execution and assessment 
duties.75 Most sections within these lower staffs have only one or two officers that are 
available to contribute to these processes and many times they are the least experienced 
officers at their particular rank within the unit. Non-commissioned officers (NCO) are 
even fewer in their numbers and most times have specific duties that do not entail 
analyzing or planning operations. Relying on a staff organization that was created to 
primarily conduct conventional force-on-force operations in a methodical step-by-step 
manner is not feasible when confronted with the multiple and diverse number of systems 
that a staff must deal with in an effects-based environment.  
I.  LACK OF LEADER EDUCATION 
 An additional obstacle to creating a culture where new ideas and concepts are 
accepted is a lack of understanding these concepts, as a result of limited educational 
exposure. As of July 2006, EBAO was not being taught at the Army Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) and for the most part is not included in lower-level officer 
training within the branches.76 Limiting what the officer, as well as non-commissioned 
officer students is exposed to conceptually will severely limit the ability to understand 
and develop opinions on these new ideas. It will also challenge the officer or NCO who 
finds himself or herself assigned to a joint staff or an Army staff with a commander who 
believes in utilizing EBAO. Because EBAO is not accepted as doctrine by TRADOC, 
many training commands refuse to include it in their lesson plans, deferring to officially 
approved written doctrine. 
J.  SUMMARY 
 The introduction of new concepts and ideas that are perceived as challenging tried 
and true doctrine faces many obstacles to its potential inclusion as acceptable warfighting 
principles. As noted in this chapter, models that are perceived as unproven will attract 
many critics who feel threatened by change. The problem with many of these critiques 
are that they have not taken into account the developmental nature of concepts and the 
                                                 
75 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), OEF/OIF CAAT Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, TRADOC, 
December 2003), 37. 
76 Dallas Eubanks, Lieutenant Colonel, telephone conversation with author on 11 July 2006. 
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fact that pre-approved notions are meant to be modified to reflect what is realistic. Most 
criticisms are posed with a “we versus them” underpinning that fail to accept alternative 
views or explanations of the issue. In the next chapter I will address each of the problems 
and challenges presented here and suggest other explanations or solutions to them and in 
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IV. REVEALING THE MISCONCEPTIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
All new concepts and ideas will initially have a number of critics that either do 
not understand these new theories or do not believe that they will work. EBAO has had 
and continues to have numerous critics from the higher echelons of Army leadership to 
academics in the Armed Forces war colleges and service academies. With time, these 
critiques may become less or more, depending on the future track record of including 
EBAO into Army operations. Ways to quiet the arguments against using effects as a basis 
for conducting operations are through the education of these critics and the requirement 
of them to officially accept these new ideals. Misconceptions can be clarified through 
information. In this chapter I will address the shortfalls and conflicts of including EBAO 
in Army doctrine. Based on those cited in the previous chapter, I will explain how these 
issues are not as necessarily as bad as some believe. 
B.  EBAO AS A REQUIREMENT 
The evolution of Army doctrine over the past 235 years has been somewhat slow 
in keeping up with developments in technology and operational theory as well as in 
instituting lessons learned from previous combat operations. It has also been rather 
stagnant since the inception of the Army Operational Concept, which followed the post-
Vietnam AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s. The progression of doctrine is best 
analogized by retired Colonel Ben S. Malcolm in his book White Tigers, when he writes 
about his experience in Infantry Officer Basic Course learning old World War II doctrine 
in preparation for deployment  to the Korean peninsula in 1951. He writes, “Army 
doctrine is something like an old mule; once it’s moving in a certain direction it is almost 
impossible to get it to move in another direction without a great deal of pulling and 
tugging and shouting.”77  
While Army doctrine may openly reject the applicability of EBAO to Army 
operations, the fact remains that joint doctrine is required to be followed by the separate 
services. The latest release of JP 3-0 encompasses joint keystone doctrine and “provides 
                                                 
77 Ben S. Malcolm, White Tigers, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 1996), 35. 
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the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the 
United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations.”78 
This requirement for the Armed Forces to follow joint doctrine is also cited within JP 3-0 
as follows: 
Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, 
commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task 
forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. The 
guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 
followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional 
circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of 
this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication 
will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.79 
Now that the CJCS has dictated through the latest release of JP3-0 that the services will 
follow joint doctrine, and EBAO being a part of that doctrine, all services, to include the 
Army, should fall in line and embrace the concept of EBAO and learn how to include 
effects-based processes into the capstone and keystone principles of the Army. 
C.  THE TRUE DEFINITION OF EBAO 
New concepts that are initially proliferated through an organization in order to 
create acceptance among skeptics as well as neutral parties can become confusing and 
misinterpreted or ill-defined. This was the case with EBAO. According to a staff officer 
at J9 in JFCOM, the initial proponents of EBO did a poor job of marketing it after it was 
experimented with in Millennium Challenge 2002.80 EBO has since evolved into a way of 
thinking. As recently as 19 May 2006, Air Force General Lance Smith, U.S. JFCOM 
Commander, referred to EBAO as being in actuality “effects-based thinking.”81 The 
realization that EBAO may not be applicable to every situation has resulted in advocates 
of the concept to tailor their rhetoric away from thinking of EBAO as the only way of 
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  33
planning, executing and assessing operations, to being a way that can be used to enhance 
the current Army methodology that is still viable in today’s operational environment. 
Many critics argue against EBAO solely on the basis that it is not officially 
sanctioned by the services as doctrine. The Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based 
Approach to Joint Operations, published 24 February 2006, concurs with this fact, stating 
that it is “a pre-doctrinal document,” but went on to clarify that it “serves as a bridge 
between the joint prototype and its migration into doctrine.”82 The recent release of JP 3-
0 confirms that EBAO is now considered to be doctrine by JFCOM, which should quell 
the arguments over whether or not the Army should even be discussing the inclusion of 
EBAO into its doctrine. JFCOM has officially recognized the importance of including the 
tools and principles of EBAO into joint doctrine by taking this controversial step of 
including effects-based ideals in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). 
The acceptance and inclusion of effects-based thinking has also resulted in the 
standardization of some terminology that has been confused between the separate 
services and the Joint community. While this will force the clarification of definitions on 
the services, the original definitions laid out both by the Army and JFCOM were not that 
different. Consider the different definitions of effect, end state, objective, task, and center 
of gravity compared to each other: 
Effect: 
 JFCOM: 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results 
from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, 
or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or 
degree of freedom.83 
 Army: A result, outcome, or consequence of an action.84 
 
End State: 
 JFCOM: The set of required conditions that defines achievement 
of the commander’s objectives.85 
                                                 
82 Joint Warfighting Center, i. 
83 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-14. 
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 Army: At the operational and tactical levels, the conditions that, 
when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these 
conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation.86 
 
Objective: 
 JFCOM: 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal 
toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the 
action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding 
of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or an enemy force or 
capability without regard to terrain features).87 
 Army: None 
 
Task: 
 JFCOM: None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 
1-02.)88 
 Army: A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by 
individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute 
to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements.89 
 
Center of Gravity: 
 JFCOM: The source of power that provides moral or physical 
strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG.90 
 Army: Same as JFCOM91 
 
After comparing these definitions, one can conclude that critics and advocates 
have been speaking past each other in their arguments. Even though JFCOM has included 
the Army version of the definition of effect in its glossary, the bottom-line is that they all 
mean the same thing. An effect is the result of an action. The JFCOM version is different 
                                                                                                                                                 
85 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-15. 
86 Field Manual 5-0, Glossary-8. 
87 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-24. 
88 Ibid., GL-31. 
89 Field Manual 5-0.1, Glossary-7. 
90 Joint Publication 3-0, GL-9. 
91 Field Manual 3-0, Glossary-3. 
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in that it is more detailed, but allows for the broadness of the Army version. The end 
state, under both definitions, is the set of conditions that mark the accomplishment of the 
mission, or in other words, the commander’s objectives. Again, these definitions are 
almost exact in meaning except for the choice of words used to define the terms.  
In some instances, JFCOM and the Army use the same definition or none at all. 
Such is the case with the terms objective, task and center of gravity. Objective is 
considered to be a graphical representation of a geographical goal by the Army, while 
JFCOM further defines it as a “goal toward which every operation is directed,” one being 
symbolic in nature and the other being more descriptive, but representing the same idea.92 
Task was previously a term for use in joint doctrine, but was excluded when EBAO 
became accepted. Use of the word was seen as a potential obstacle in embarking on the 
holistic approach of EBAO and working with non-military entities that may not feel 
comfortable or accept being tasked.93 The Army still utilizes this term, but does not 
define it as directing subordinates to accomplish the activity that it describes. Finally, 
center of gravity is accepted by both JFCOM and the Army as meaning the same thing. 
D.  A NEEDED FOCUS TO DOCTRINE 
Change is difficult and no one likes to change the way they work when the 
methods used in the past are considered successful, but the change in the OE warrants 
change in methodology. The inclusion of EBAO does not necessarily change the 
processes that the Army has used in the past, specifically the MDMP process. It merely 
enhances and focuses the process to include more actors and tools in the goal of 
accomplishing the mission. Some have argued that EBAO is not as useful in the planning 
process because it only determines what needs to be done while the MDMP process 
establishes what needs to be done by whom, how and when.94 Effects-based planning 
does focus on what is to be done in order to gain a certain effect, but in doing so, it also 
resolves how, or by what method, effects are to be achieved, who is the best element to 
achieve them, and when the best time is to attempt achievement. Effects-based concepts 
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will not supplant MDMP, but will supplement it.95 The focus on effects and a system-of-
systems approach to seeing the OE complements the Army’s devotion to unified action 
and full spectrum operations that the Army claims responsibility to in the its Operational 
Concept. In the past, the Army has talked about a holistic view of conducting operations 
in its doctrine, but didn’t truly execute that way. The current wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have required the Army to re-evaluate its methods and place focus on all the 
elements of national power that can have an effect all the way down to the tactical level 
of war. EBAO is that focus. Effects may have always been a concern for commanders 
and staffs in the past, but accomplishment of tasks were the focal point. In his statement 
about EBAO, General Smith went on to state that  
It’s [EBAO] not completely new. Effects-based thinking has always 
occurred in one form or another. But it is a more formalized approach 
[EBAO] to how you go about building tools to help you do that.96  
JFCOM has openly acknowledged that EBAO is not new. Therefore, critics should not be 
surprised by the formalization of doctrine to include processes that Joint Forces and the 
Army have done all along. 
E.  APPLICABILITY TO ALL LEVELS OF WARFARE 
The concept of EBO was initially only considered applicable to the strategic and 
operational levels of war, but with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
and a considerable change in the OE, came a need to change tactics to fit the enemy. This 
in turn resulted in the experimentation of using EBAO at the tactical level, which has 
proven successful in a number of units in Iraq and Afghanistan. JFCOM recognizes that 
effects-based concepts are applicable to the joint strategic and operational levels of 
conflict, but it also states that the introduction of EBAO in joint conception is “not 
intended to exclude the non-joint community,” meaning that it is just as applicable to the 
services when they conduct operations alone and even more so in a pseudo-joint setting.97 
EBAO should be applied where it works and not just in places or commands that it was 
originally meant for. 
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Even though EBAO is more easily executed and sourced at the strategic and 
operational levels of command, both JFCOM, as well as the U.S. Army Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and units in OIF and OEF have 
recognized the utility of it at the tactical level. These ideas have been so successful and 
effective to tactical units, that JRTC, through the Center for Army Lessons Learned 
(CALL) published handbooks outlining how EBAO can be used from the company to the 
corps levels.98 These manuals were written in 2004 by professional trainers and observers 
at one of the premier training centers of the U.S. Army under the auspices of the 
clearinghouse for lessons learned throughout the Army about a concept that was being 
touted by senior leadership as unnecessary and unacceptable as doctrine. For the Soldiers 
charged with honing the skills of tactical units to write extensively on a so-called 
unproven method against the opinions of superiors goes to prove the importance of 
accepting EBAO as a viable process at the tactical level. 
The tenants of EBAO are essential to any operation whether it is at an armor 
battalion or a combined forces command. Understanding the OE as a system of systems 
is critical in visualizing the complete AO. Leaving out one vital link or node can mean 
the difference between success and failure when considering the complex systems that 
company, battalion, brigade and division commanders find themselves dealing with on a 
daily basis. The renewed need for working within a civilian setting and conducting 
stability and security operations requires commanders and staffs at all levels to embrace 
the massive amount of information, behaviors and relationships in these environments to 
fully understand who the friendly, enemy and neutral forces are and how to make them 
do what you want without excessive force. EBAO helps identify an unidentifiable enemy 
(insurgents) through the execution of a holistic approach to these unconventional 
environments. It also prepares commanders and staffs at an earlier level on a system they 
will see later. 
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The implementation of EBAO at the tactical level begs the question of whether or 
not commanders and staffs at these levels have the capability to conduct effects-based 
processes and determine what effects are desired and undesired as well as how best to 
accomplish them. Can subordinate commands at the tactical level distinguish between 
accomplishing a task and creating an effect? The multiple combat rotations, extensive 
military education, vast combat experience and high intelligence of today’s officer corps 
demonstrates they can. The Army’s confidence in the principle of mission command also 
makes viable this ability of commanders to decide whether a unit should conduct one 
type of specified task rather than another task that would still generate the desired effect. 
Commanders at all levels are given responsibilities to make the right decisions and 
choose the right options, especially in combat. This is the mainstay of mission command 
theory.99 Through the commander’s intent, which according to FMI 5-0.1, “is a clear, 
concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to 
succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the 
operation’s desired end state,” subordinate commanders and staffs can make the 
appropriate decisions in determining what the best course of action is in dealing with 
effects or tasks.100 By following the commander’s intent, subordinates and staffs are 
enabled to take the initiative during the execution phase of operations.101 As an example, 
areas like Baghdad can be very dynamic requiring that commander’s intent be broad and 
general considering that one tactic for enforcing security in one area of the city may not 
necessarily be applicable across all street blocks. By allowing commanders the room to 
make decisions based on their understanding of the AO, success may be more easily 
achieved with less risk to Soldiers. 
F.  A METHOD FOR ALL SYSTEMS 
The initial concepts of EBAO were developed to be more systemic and 
conformed to a particular situation. With the constant changes in the OE since 9/11, 
developers broadened the scope into what is now considered a way of thinking versus the 
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way to do things. Because of the highly interactive complexity of the systems within the 
OE that commanders and staffs deal with today, EBAO has become a more dynamic 
process that can help enable units to better understand their environment and how the 
enemy, friendly and neutral forces effect that environment. Through this understanding, 
commanders can utilize every asset available, in conjunction with the other elements of 
national power, to change how the different external and internal actors are causing the 
systems to operate, thus creating an environment that he can control and safely operate in. 
General Fastabend’s argument of applying a reductionist method like systems 
analysis to a highly dynamic system that includes the PMESII elements as not feasible 
takes a very narrow approach to the idea of EBAO.102 Effects-based thinking can bridge 
the gap between taking a reductionist way of analyzing systems and inducing a holistic 
process of dealing with these systems. The understanding of the OE, for example, from 
the minute detail of how a city block interacts to the broad connections of the national 
actors, is essential to the future of warfare at all levels. The key is the need to break down 
these systems to determine how they interact with each other and keep these relationships 
in mind when deciding how best to manipulate the system from the different elements of 
national power - DIME. Strictly applying EBAO to the planning, execution and 
assessment processes will not give staffs all the answers of how to directly defeat an 
enemy, but by applying effects-based thinking they will better understand how to create 
an environment where the enemy can no longer operate, thus enhancing their ability to 
succeed. Just because EBAO may not apply to every aspect of conducting operations 
does not mean that it should be disregarded altogether. If a method supports overall 
mission accomplishment, it should be included in doctrine, even if it is considered 
optional. 
G.  BROADENED MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
Warfare is both an art and a science. Not all aspects contributing to success can be 
measured precisely, but many can, and those that cannot rely on educated analysis and 
judgment to determine their effectiveness and performance. To infer that all elements of 
success or failure can be reduced to mathematical formulas is unwise. The key to being as 
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precise as possible, when dealing with immeasurable factors, is to be as objective as 
possible. MOEs and MOPs are not only determined by staff assessments and analysis, but 
by the commander’s intent and purpose. These statements allow staffs to compare the 
current situation against what the commander wants to measure the successfulness of the 
operation. While preciseness provides more empirical proof of success, it does not 
guarantee success. 
EBAO, contrary to what Professor Vego believes, is not an attempt to reduce 
warfare to a matter of mathematical methods. It introduces scientific preciseness as a part 
of the operational design to the dynamic environment which also relies on operational art. 
Measuring success can be as broad as determining if a unit is “doing the right things” that 
are “producing the desired effects” and if not, deciding whether “alternative actions [are] 
required,” which is a MOE.103 It can also be as precise as a MOP, which measures if 
actions were taken and if so, were they (tasks) “completed to standard, or how much 
effort was involved.”104 The latter assesses effects, does not measure task performance, is 
usually more subjective, and can be qualitative or quantitative, while the former is 
generally task-oriented at the tactical level and quantitative, being more precise and 
engagement specific. Even though these assessment measures are different in what they 
measure, they are interrelated when it comes to establishing success. One MOP may have 
an effect on the higher commands MOE and in some instances they may be the same 
measurement depending on whether the tactical unit is task-oriented or effects-oriented. 
The goal of assessing an operation may be to determine the effectiveness of actions, but 
success will not always be revealed through numbers and statistics. EBAO is not an 
attempt to reduce the significance of operational art, but to introduce the possibility of 
measuring effects and actions that were previously deemed to be immeasurable. 
H.  CHANGING THE CULTURE 
Major shifts in doctrine usually create ripple effects of resistance and resentment 
by those averse to change. Sometimes it can take a whole generation before changes are 
accepted, and even then there are still dissenters. The introduction of EBAO has 
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definitely gone through this trend over the past five years, but the culture is changing in 
the Army to include more tolerance of new ideas and concepts. Since 2003, evidence of 
the acceptance of EBAO can be determined by the increased number of interviews with 
general officers, articles written about unit operations in OEF and OIF, and lessons 
learned reports coming out of the GWOT concerning the use of effect-based thinking. 
While the Army leadership continues to resist including EBAO into service doctrine, 
subordinates from the corps level down are continuing to prove its effectiveness in 
forging success. In fact, both Majors General John Batiste of the 1st Infantry Division and 
Task Force Danger, and Peter Chiarelli of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National 
Division, Baghdad in Iraq claim that EBAO was an important part of their successes in 
OIF.105 
As junior and mid-level officers become more familiar with the usefulness of 
including EBAO into planning and execution of operations at all levels of warfare, Army 
leadership will eventually be forced to acknowledge this and include these concepts into 
the keystone and capstone doctrine. The key to this is finalizing the effects concept into 
joint doctrine, which JFCOM has done in the recent publication of JP 3-0 in September 
2006. The lexicon afforded by inclusion of EBAO into joint manuals should translate into 
eventual inclusion into service manuals, but this is only one step. Other steps will be to 
include effects-based thinking in all officer and non-commissioned officer schools, as 
well as transform staff organization into ones that can effectively and efficiently apply 
the basics of system-of-systems analysis and the holistic view of the OE to provide 
commanders with other options than purely combat operations reliant upon  
force-on-force engagement to defeat the enemy. 
I.  ACCEPTABLE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
Most commanders would love to have more staff support with more experience to 
conduct 24-hour operations in a hostile environment. The reality is that there are usually 
not enough experienced staff officers or NCOs to go around, given the need for this vital 
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commodity in other areas of the Army. The other reality is that the inclusion of effects-
based thinking into Army operations does not necessarily translate into an inflation or 
total reorganization of the staff from the battalion level and up or the specialty officers 
like the fire support officer at the company level and below. In many cases at the 
division, brigade and battalion level, staffs can be augmented with more support in the 
intelligence, fire support, and civil affairs sections, plus additional capability to extend 
liaison officers to adjacent organizations that make up the rest of the elements of national 
power. At the corps level, (possibly division, and above) staffs may need extensive 
augmentation to perform the tasks of EBAO. 
The goal of the organization when executing EBAO, no matter what size the staff, 
is to ensure cross-functional coordination across the different staff sections and external 
organizations. The size of a staff is a reflection of the area of responsibility (AOR) that 
the unit commander maintains control over. The small area that battalions have 
responsibility for warrants a limited number of personnel in the staff. As you move up the 
command relationship hierarchy from brigade on, units become larger along with their 
staffs. The same could be said about staff augmentation for implementing effects-based 
thinking. Lower levels of command deal with smaller systems that have limited reach 
across the AOR, thus staffs need less manning to conduct EBAO. When managing a large 
province at the brigade or division levels, staffs need to be more robust with more senior 
and experienced members who are capable of maintaining visualization of a larger 
system-of-systems and being able to coordinate with higher level and larger numbers of  
external agencies. When staffs are not manned to conduct fulltime EWGs or EACs like 
the joint staff is, ad hoc groups of representatives can be formed to execute these 
functions.  
J.  EDUCATING THE FUTURE LEADERS AND STAFF 
The constantly changing aspects of the current OE call for leaders at all levels to 
be as capable as ever to manage and make decisions dynamically. Leaders need to be 
afforded the opportunity to experience new concepts and ideas that may help them later 
on as they progress through the ranks. The way to prepare these new and continuing 
leaders for this environment and effect the Army culture that has not wholly accepted 
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EBAO is through leader training. As Colonel Batschelet said it in an article on EBO, 
“Effects-based operations demand the Army develop leaders capable of conceptual 
thinking” and not just procedure following.106 Instead of simply being able to conduct a 
battle drill, they must be able to react within a highly complex system and deal with a 
multitude of internal and external players and factors that all have an effect on whether 
these leaders succeed or fail. They also must be prepared to interact with non-military 
and non-governmental elements that do not understand the military culture and in some 
cases feel threatened by military involvement. In other cases these leaders may need to 
deal with foreign governments, militaries and civilians, such as in OIF and OEF. All 
these factors require the need for a more holistic and joint approach to training leaders, 
both junior and senior. 
These training venues must initially focus on the basics and eventually work their 
way towards the more complex issues. By exposing leaders to all aspects of the OE, they 
will be better prepared for the multifaceted AOR. Future leaders need to have a better 
understanding of the other elements of national power to include “domestic and 
international politics, culture, diplomacy and economics.”107 This familiarization begins 
from commissioning sources like the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer 
Training Corps and Officer Candidate School. At each level, from the Basic Officer 
Leader Course to the branch-specific Officer Basic Course and then to the Captains 
Career Courses, Command and General Staff College and Army War College, leaders 
must be developed into successfully functional components of an Army that must 
continue to change and progress with the changing environment. 
K.  SUMMARY 
Both the arguments for and against EBAO can be perceived as valid depending on 
the context. Approaching the concept of EBAO as a valid doctrine, when it is presented 
as the only way to conduct operations, is not viable. Absolutes are rarely applicable to 
warfare. Every operation is different and should be executed accordingly. Maintaining 
that EBAO is applicable to every Army operation at every level of warfare is not 
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conducive to the ever-changing scope of military operations. In this chapter, I have 
presented arguments for how and when EBAO may be pertinent to the Army Operational 
Concept. The bottom-line is that effects-based thinking can be useful to better 
understanding operational circumstances and can provide other options for defeating 
enemies and stabilizing conditions, either in a military or civilian setting. The next 
chapter will provide recommendations for the implementation of effects-based thinking 
into the Army Operational Concept using the categories of doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters of this thesis have laid out the evolution and formal 
definition of EBAO and effects-based thinking, as well as the development of Army 
doctrine into what it is today, in the form of the Army Operational Concept. This thesis 
has taken the criticisms and potential shortfalls of EBAO inclusion and refuted or 
supported these arguments for the use and implementation of EBAO into current Army 
doctrine. The implementation of new ideas and concepts into doctrine can have major 
impacts on a number of areas that are essential to Army and joint operations. The focus 
of this chapter will be to make recommendations to the reader on how EBAO can be 
included in the conduct of operations from the tactical to the strategic levels of war. They 
are based on the potential implications of implementing EBAO into Army doctrine. 
These suggestions will be presented in the form of doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). While not all of these 
elements are effected to a great extent, each one has a place in the development of 
emerging doctrine and must be considered when making decisions that will have a major 
impact on the way the Army conducts business. At the end of this chapter, I will present a 
brief thesis conclusion that will recommend that the Army realize what the future of 
warfare holds for it and implement EBAO into doctrine at all levels.  
B.  DOCTRINE 
The impact of including effects-based thinking into Army doctrine will be 
minimal with the assumption that the Army has been doing this all along. The only 
difference will be that the processes for planning, executing and assessing operations will 
be more focused and formalized to include a more holistic view of the OE, better 
integration of all the elements of national power – DIME and more reliance on 
understanding effects and how task accomplishment can achieve or negate desired 
effects. It will also spell out more dependence on one of the fundamental aspects of the 
Army Operational Concept – mission command – that relies on the abilities of 
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subordinate commanders and staffs to make decisions based on their knowledge of the 
OE without formal direction from higher commands.  
Now that effects-based concepts have been accepted as doctrine by JFCOM and 
included in JP 3-0 and 5-0, the Army should follow lead and accept its requirement to 
follow joint doctrine. If effects-based thinking is to be included in key joint publications 
for use by the joint community, which will include Army counterparts, it must be 
included in the keystone and capstone Army doctrine and reflect the Army’s dedication 
to unified action and recognition that all operations in the future will be joint, interagency 
and multinational. This newly accepted doctrine will now alleviate much of the confusion 
over what EBAO truly is and the plethora of definitions that have convoluted the 
understanding of it. The institutionalization of effects-based thinking will preclude 
further confusion over what is really meant by effects. 
The current version of the MDMP will not change significantly, but will be better 
focused on achieving effects instead of purely accomplishing tasks and will set a new 
standard for the planning of Army operations. Since the MDMP process is applicable to 
organizations from battalion to corps, it must be changed to reflect the changing nature of 
staff organization and responsibility. EBAO is being implemented into every command 
that is currently being stood up as a joint task force (JTF) in the GWOT and the majority 
of these commands are being pulled from the Army at the corps and division levels. 
Unfortunately, because EBAO is not a part of Army doctrine and is not being taught or 
even introduced in the Army educational system, staffs are required to be trained by 
elements from J7 at JFCOM and in some cases are augmented with additional planners 
who are well versed in the process of EBAO.108 By including EBAO into the MDMP 
process, these staffs will have a better understanding of joint operations and the 
implications of effects on the conduct of war. It will also alleviate the additional training 
and preparation that goes into getting these staffs ready to conduct a mission that they are  
not normally meant to in the past. While EBAO should not replace the MDMP process, it 
                                                 
108 Rhett Russell, Lieutenant Colonel, USJFCOM J7, Interview with author, 15 November 2006. 
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should supplement it and thus enhance the capabilities of future staffs in  
planning, executing and assessing JTF operations. 
Another implication of including EBAO into Army doctrine is the familiarization 
that commanders and staffs, and officers and enlisted personnel will have of EBAO. The 
development of tasks and purposes below the JTF levels that are based on effects 
achievement requires that subordinates understand what the JTF commander is trying to 
accomplish. The only way to understand the process behind the plan development is to 
understand the nature of effects and the OE. By including EBAO into Army doctrine, 
Soldiers up and down the chain of command and levels of warfare will better understand 
why they are executing a task. This will, in turn, result in more effective execution and 
reduction of confusion in attempting to understand the overall objectives of the JTF.  
The introduction of effects into the MDMP process and the Army Operational 
Concept is needed because it has utility at all levels of warfare. EBAO has been used in 
one form or another by units in OEF and OIF from the company to the corps level with 
great success. Two initial impression reports (IIR) conducted in the 3rd Infantry Division 
and 82nd Airborne Division by teams from CALL note how these units used EBAO to 
their advantages. These IIRs go on to recommend the Army pursue further development 
of the concept. One report declares that “Effects based operations is an effective method 
of planning, executing, and assessing operations and it should be seriously considered for 
inclusion into doctrine.”109 Another recommends that “TRADOC should develop doctrine 
on how the Army uses effects based operations and how they fit into the planning 
process.”110 Other recommendations come from the previously mentioned JRTC when it 
published the two handbooks through CALL describing how to implement EBAO into 
operations at all levels of warfare within the Army construct. These recommendations 
                                                 
109 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), 82nd Airborne Division Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL TRADOC, 
January 2003), 1-5. 
110 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), Initial Impressions Report No. 06-10: 3ID Modular Force Assessment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
CALL TRADOC, March 2006), 6. 
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and evidence of the effective utilization of EBAO should not be disregarded, but should 
be added to the argument for doctrinal inclusion. 
C.  ORGANIZATION 
Changing the way that operations are conducted does not necessarily mean that 
the structure of organizations should be changed as well, but in some cases it does. The 
scope of operations that an organization is responsible for controlling will ultimately 
determine the extent of change that is needed. The same processes that are conducted at 
the battalion level are also conducted at the brigade, division and corps levels, but at 
different scales and depth. These differences are what require adjustments in structure in 
order to ensure mission accomplishment at that particular level. Units that are charged 
with controlling joint, interagency and multinational elements must have an organization 
in place to do so, while units that are focused at the tactical level within a smaller AOR 
may not necessarily require an adjustment. 
If corps and division headquarters are to be expected to operate as JTFs in the 
future then they should be resourced to do so. While the augmentation of these staffs by 
effects planners are beneficial, it does not alleviate the fact that once the organization 
concludes its combat rotation it will lose these additional personnel and experience that 
they provide. Why not create corps and division staffs that have the permanent capability 
to conduct effects-based thinking and eliminate the need for future augmentation? If these 
units are to train as they fight then they should be organized to train and fight the same 
way on a continual basis.  
Units at the brigade and below levels do not need to be augmented with additional 
organic staff personnel since they are conducting the same operations within the confines 
of their AORs, but their organizations should be configured to take advantage of the 
implementation of effects. The focus on non-lethal versus lethal effects requires an 
element of the staff that is charged with synchronizing and coordinating all the additional 
capabilities that the commander now has at his disposal. This staff section is the Fire and 
Effects Coordination Cell (FECC), formerly known as the Fire Support Element (FSE), 
and is led by the Effects Coordinator (ECOORD), formerly known as the Fire Support 
Coordinator (FSCOORD). The Army has gone back and forth on the naming convention 
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of this group from FSE to FECC and back to FSE. Adding an additional duty to the fires 
elements of these organizations does not take away from their ability to conduct fire 
support operations, but capitalizes on their ability to synchronize effects to accomplish 
the commander’s intent and ensure that all the different elements of effects are included 
in the planning and execution process.  
The key to developing an organization that is effective and efficient and can 
conduct required processes in a timely manner is to understand what works and what 
does not work in the field. Lessons learned and recommendations from units in OEF and 
OIF should be carefully evaluated and considered for potential changes in staff structure. 
The end result should be an organization that is properly resourced to carry out assigned 
tasks, but not overly inflated with additional infrastructure that hinders staff operations. 
D.  TRAINING 
Proficiency in execution is a result of the practice of tasks to standard. Acceptance 
of EBAO as doctrine will require the Army to adjust the mission essential task lists 
(METL) of the units that it affects. These METLs will need to reflect the additional 
processes that EBAO will create within the staffs. By continually rehearsing these new 
steps of the MDMP, staffs at all levels will remain familiar and proficient in the 
execution of effects-based thinking and will require much less train-up time in 
preparation for future combat operations. 
The introduction of a holistic approach to understanding the OE and using the 
DIME elements of national power to affect that OE will require staffs to train with joint, 
interagency and multinational partners to ensure that they are prepared to conduct actual 
operations in a theater of war. Because of the issues with training staffs with a limited 
number of actual assets that make up non-Army and non-military actors within the OE, 
training centers like the National Training Center (NTC), JRTC and the Battle Command 
Training Program (BCTP) will need to duplicate these elements in order to put the staffs 
through the rigor of coordinating a unity of effort. When possible, actual representatives 
from these other areas should be included in training exercises with the use of actors 
being a last resort. Authenticity should be a focus of these exercises so that trainees get 
the most out of them while gaining much needed experience. 
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E.  MATERIEL 
Very little additional materiel is needed when implementing EBAO. One 
misperception is that the effects-based assessment process requires massive amounts of 
information that is cataloged and correlated through the use of computer technology that 
provides visualization of the OE, collaboration between staff elements and 
synchronization of the different efforts used to achieve effects. The EBAO process can be 
conducted just as the MDMP process is, with pen and paper. While elaborate 
computerized models and visual effects might help in the process, they are by no means 
necessary. The current collaboration tools and databases within the Army Battle 
Command System (ABCS) could prove useful in execution of EBAO. These ABCS 
systems are utilized by all staffs from battalion up and are effective in sharing 
information and providing a common operating picture to both superiors and 
subordinates. Even though the development of new systems is not required for EBAO, 
current off the shelf systems will enhance the ability of staffs to coordinate efforts. 
Where advances need to be made in the areas of collaboration and 
synchronization is when dealing with non-Army/military groups that staffs must combine 
efforts with on the battlefield. Systems need to be developed in order to easily and 
securely share information with these elements that are not normally prepared to operate 
in a secure information environment. Until such a system is emplaced, the use of liaison 
teams will fill the void. Unfortunately, these teams may need to be taken out of current 
structure unless the Army is prepared to temporarily grow organizations that are capable 
of accomplishing this task. 
F.  LEADERSHIP 
The success of EBAO implementation rests on the belief of leadership in the 
concept and the inclusion in the Army education system. These steps will result in the 
institutionalization of effects-based thinking and full acceptance into doctrine and 
training. This institutionalization should begin from the time an officer pins on second 
lieutenant bars and should gradually progress throughout his or her career. 
New officers should, at a minimum, be introduced to EBAO when he or she 
enters the newly founded Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). As they progress 
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through their careers and attend additional military educational courses such as branch 
specific Officer Basic Courses (OBC) and Captains Career Courses (CCC), Intermediate 
Level Education (ILE), and the Army War College (AWC), officers should gain better 
understanding of how EBAO works and how it relates to the conduct of operations at all 
levels of warfare. Officers should gain familiarization at BOLC and OBC and then begin 
to learn the process when they are taught MDMP at CCC. As they continue to ILE they 
must learn how to become joint staff officers able to be assigned to a JTF and function 
effectively. Only by continued education and experience will the Army be able to 
produce the future leaders and staff officers that are able to execute effects-based 
thinking and conduct planning, execution and assessment at any level of command, to 
include JTF. Even though officers at the platoon and company may not vary from the 
TLPs, they must understand how and why their higher commands use EBAO. By 
understanding how effects translate into tasks or subordinate effects, junior officers will 
be in a better position to accomplish their assigned tasks or effects to achieve the desired 
effects laid out by higher headquarters. 
EBAO is currently taught at the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
level II, but the problem is that few Army officers receive this type of education before 
they are assigned to joint staffs or staffs at the division level and above. Current Army 
education must do a better job of ensuring that junior to mid-grade officers receive the 
proper tools and knowledge to prepare them for the many staff positions that they will fill 
in their future careers.  
G.  PERSONNEL 
The prospect of additional personnel goes hand-in-hand with the growth of 
organizational staffs that are expected to become something that they were not initially 
designed to be, such as the division headquarters becoming a JTF enroute to OEF and/or 
OIF. Depending upon the OE that staffs at the brigade and below are operating in 
determines whether or not staffs need additional augmentation of planners and other staff 
officers. Normally at these levels, additional personnel are not needed, but at division and 
above additional personnel are needed given the increased size of the AOR they are given 
and the increased size and elements of the system of systems that they are dealing with.  
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H.  FACILITIES 
The implementation of EBAO into Army operational doctrine has no significant 
impact on the need for additional facilities. Current facilities are adequate in the training 
and conduct of exercises used to test and evaluate staffs in their proficiency of EBAO. 
The same aids used in the conduct of MDMP and other staff operations can be used when 
adding effects-based thinking. 
I. FURTHER RECOMMENDED STUDY AND RESEARCH 
Further study is required if one declares that effects-based thinking is applicable 
to Army operational doctrine and the MDMP process. Studies are required on how units 
in OEF and OIF use effects to their advantage and how they include EBAO into their 
planning, execution and assessing processes. Doing so will assist in determining how the 
MDMP process can be restructured to better reflect the evolution of the Army 
Operational Concept into a more holistic, effects-based methodology.  
Analyzing the use of current and future network capabilities will create a more 
holistic view of the OE. Using current technology to conduct SoSA could potentially 
enhance the staff’s ability to develop needed effects and could minimize the time it takes 
to plan their efforts. Technical testing and evaluation, by collecting multiple data and 
determining how the process can be manipulated to produce the best data, can also work 
for doctrine development. 
Future students in military arts and science, as well as the concepts and doctrine 
directorates within the Army should focus effort on how EBAO can best be used within 
the service. This is a better approach than ignoring EBAO. Open minds need to embrace 
these ideas, fully study the problem and develop possible solutions before giving up and 
relying on what has historically worked in past eras. Only through further study and 
research will EBAO be accepted as doctrine. 
J.  CONCLUSION 
The evolution of effects-based thinking from EBO and EBAO has proven to be a 
difficult struggle in the progressive development of future Army operational doctrine. 
Attempts to broaden concepts that were initially meant for the Cold War environment 
have been met with much criticism and rejection from the Army. Most of these criticisms 
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are based on misunderstanding of definitions, culture and complexity. Effects-based 
thinking provides a capability to commanders and staffs at all levels to react to the 
constant changes to the OE. If the OE is understood as a set of interconnected, 
interrelated systems, such as PMESII, it will also be understood that there requires more 
than a military solution. The OE can be compared to how a balloon operates. When 
pressure is applied to one side of the balloon, unless with a sharp object, the balloon does 
not break, it changes shape. In order to compress the balloon, pressure must be placed all 
around it. During the Cold War and earlier it was thought that the U.S. could “win” by 
defeating adversaries militarily through seizing capitals and declaring victory. This 
military on military strategy works when the military is the primary “ways and means.” 
The challenge arises when adversaries do not use a military as the primary means to 
achieve victory while the U.S. does. This results in a mismatch in both ways and means. 
EBAO works to balance the mismatch and bring all the elements of national power to 
bear on the adversary.111 
The Army should take advantage of the emerging joint doctrine of an effects-
based framework and capitalize on its utility in operational doctrine. Including EBAO 
into the MDMP process will enhance a staff’s ability to plan, execute and assess 
operations in an ever-changing OE, complicated by an interconnected and dynamic 
system of systems. Ironically, units in combat have done much to adapt to this new 
environment. Now is the time to formalize and institutionalize these efforts. After all, 
tactical commanders are applying EBAO without doctrine. The recognition that doctrine 
must evolve as a result of these changes and the ability of subordinate commands and 
staffs to determine the best approaches in achieving desired effects will prove successful 
in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These new concepts will not change the way 
the Army operates, but will focus DIME efforts and make them available to the 
commander and staff. Conflicts in the future will be joint efforts requiring Army forces at 
all levels to consider joint, interagency, and multinational actors during operations. The 
Army can no longer conduct operations within a vacuum that only focuses on the “M” in 
                                                 
111 Stephen Runals, USJFCOM Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ(CE)), 
Interview with author, 16 November 2006. 
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DIME. It must pave the way ahead with emerging ideas that have proven effective in the 
GWOT and address the ever-changing aspect of warfare by including EBAO into Army 
operational doctrine. 
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